Separateness and Desert: a Rawlsian Problem by P. Marrone
 2012, Diritto e questioni pubbliche, Palermo. 
 
 Tutti i diritti sono riservati.  
 
 
 
 
 
PIERPAOLO MARRONE 
Separateness and Desert: a Rawlsian Problem 
 
 
ABSTRACT: 
Through a close analysis of a single paragraph of J. Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, I 
examine his position on the issue of desert and show how it does not take into account 
the separateness of persons. 
 
KEYWORDS: 
Rawls, justice, fairness, desert, separateness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
PIERPAOLO MARRONE
*
 
 
Separateness and Desert: a Rawlsian Problem 
 
 
My paper will deal with a matter of detail relating to an ap-
parently secondary passage of a text, conversely, much com-
mented and known, even to a text that is considered, rightly, 
the reference work for most of the debate within political phi-
losophy and ethics since forty years. I am referring to, of 
course, A Theory of Justice by John Rawls (henceforth quoted 
as TJ). The background of Rawls’s philosophy will be given 
largely for granted precisely for these reasons. 
If, however, I hope to say something meaningful on a 
paragraph of TJ, it is not just for a philological love of par-
ticular, but because I believe that in a work so architectur-
ally structured like that of Rawls, perhaps more than in oth-
ers, the devil is often in the details.  
One of the charges that Rawls addresses to utilitarianism 
is the famous criticism that it does not take seriously the 
individuality of any person, because of the monistic princi-
ple of preference aggregation, which seems essential to the 
very idea of a social utilitarianism. Some have inferred from 
this charge that a general skepticism about principles should 
be accepted in moral philosophy. While I think that rawlsian 
accusation against utilitarianism can be widely revolted 
against Rawls himself, I believe that it would be inappropri-
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ate to reject principles in political philosophy and moral phi-
losophy because principles would be indifferent to particular 
cases. Our moral and cooperative experience has be en 
made by special cases that need to be traced back to princi-
ples to form a meaningful experience and this is the reason 
why any version of “moral particularism” should be rejected 
in political and moral philosophy. Principles of justice seem 
to incorporate the possibility of correcting injustices in par-
ticular cases, so to answer to some concerns expressed by 
particularism, since their first formulation. 
It is appropriate to recall the two founding principles of 
the social contract construction of Rawls, expressed as it is 
known in the two principles of justice: 
 
«First: each person is to have an equal right to the most ex-
tensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for 
others. Second: social and economic inequalities are to be 
arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be 
to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and 
offices open to all»
1
. 
 
These two principles are lexically ordered–the second prin-
ciple must be subordinated to the first–and this is consistent 
both with the idea of Rawls that individuals hold a sense of 
justice and with the idea that the limits of power should be 
specifically designed. This means, for example, that a re-
striction of liberty is only compatible with the preservation 
of liberty, but not with the extension of social welfare or 
with more efficient institutions. 
Since the two principles shape all social institutions and 
model a fair social cooperation, the benefit sand burdens of 
cooperation must ultimately be judged also from a founda-
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tional perspective, that is from the perspective of perfect 
procedural justice. The perfect procedural justice, using 
Kantian terminology, is the transcendental condition of our 
critical judgment on any institution and on any action with 
social significance. It represents, in other words, the condi-
tion of possibility of institutions in accordance with the two 
principles. Of course, we do not live in that sub specie 
aeternitatis world, as Rawls lyrically writes at the end of TJ, 
but it is that perspective that makes possible to critically 
judge social actions and institutions. 
The call to fairness is nothing more than this: calling for 
corrections in accordance with the two principles. But which 
kind of call? Since equity has this corrective dimension, 
common sense thinks that this claim consists of and is based 
upon some qualities of the subject, in particular, some of 
his/her moral qualities, which have been violated. Some of 
these qualities can be grouped under the name of “moral 
desert”. “Moral desert” is an expression with indeterminate 
holistic meaning. «There is a tendency for common sense to 
suppose that income and wealth, and the good things in life 
generally, should be distributed according to moral desert»
2
. 
Among the good things of life there is, no doubt, being 
treated with fairness, of course. Immediately after, with a 
suggestion that Rawls clearly takes from Kant, Rawls writes 
that «While it is recognized that this ideal can never be 
ful1y carried out, it is the appropriate conception of distribu-
tive justice, at least as a prima facie principle, and society 
should try to realize it as circumstances permit»
3
. The Kant-
ian suggestion is that those who act morally, doing what the 
formality of moral law requires have a rational hope that 
their acting morally makes them worthy of happiness. «Jus-
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tice is happiness according to virtue»
4
, we could say, modu-
lating this Kantian mantra, but this is an ideal, that must be 
designed against the empirical circumstances. However, 
these circumstances are the empirical material - the contin-
gency of human and political life - that must be corrected by 
the transcendental conditions represented by the two princi-
ples of justice. Like Kant’s categorical imperative, this em-
pirical material is both a necessary condition and a poten-
tially polluting condition. In the categorical imperative, 
which is the fact of reason, nothing should be sensitive; by 
means of the principles of justice, by contrast, everything is 
significant, because it can imperfectly realize what is re-
quired by a liberal community structured by the two princi-
ples. In both cases, empirical and contingent conditions rep-
resent a condition of realization, although not a condition of 
possibility, which would be to mix inappropriately the em-
pirical with the transcendental. 
Justice should represent, according to common sense, the 
realization of some desert, or at least should be sensitive to 
the recognition of individual desert. The goods should be 
distributed according to the Aristotelian principle of “to 
each his own”: this seems to be the appropriate conception, 
prima facie and intuitively, of the realization of justice in 
our imperfect world, as far as at least it can be in accordance 
with the circumstances, always inadequate, of an empirical 
life. What does Rawls think of all this? 
 
«Now justice as fairness rejects this conception. Such a 
principle would not be chosen in the original position. 
There seems to be no way of defining the requisite criterion 
in that situation. Moreover, the notion of distribution ac-
cording to virtue fails to distinguish between moral desert 
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and legitimate expectations»
5
. 
 
Does Rawls mean that the application of the principle of 
giving “to each his own” is impossible? On the one hand, 
the answer seems to be positive, because «the notion of dis-
tribution according to virtue fails to distinguish between 
moral desert and legitimate expectations»
6
. Indeed, we do 
not expect that a judicial decision or a general political deci-
sion is structured by the amount of virtue of the subject who 
the decision is addressed to. Such procedure would be ap-
propriate, for example, in a caste system society, but not in a 
society worried to outline some general and/or initial condi-
tions of opportunity(constrained by insurance terms of 
choice, for example). A distribution of justice according to 
virtue then would violate the conditions of fairness. How-
ever, it remains true that 
 
«it is true that as persons and groups take part in just ar-
rangements, they acquire claims on one another defined by 
the publicly recognized rules. Having done various things 
encouraged by the existing arrangements, they now have cer-
tain rights, and just distributive shares honor these claims»
7
. 
 
This is what normally happens in optimal situations of mu-
tual cooperation. These situations are formalized in games 
that involve an indefinite number of moves(after all, with a 
statement, subsequently corrected, but that remains highly 
significant, Rawls has described the theory of justice as a 
part, perhaps the most significant, of the theory of games) 
and the strategy to adopt is ultimately the one suggested by 
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R. Axelrod
8
, a simple tit for tat: start cooperating and 1) 
keep on cooperating if the other has cooperated; or 2) defeat 
if the other has defeated, There are both formal and empiri-
cal demonstrations that this strategy brings about the great-
est net balance in situations where the number of moves is 
indefinite (but not in games of just one move, or where the 
number of moves is known. In the first case the greatest net 
balance is produced defeating and in the second case, if the 
other one has cooperated in all the previous moves, you 
should defect at the last move). 
The fact that «having done various things encouraged by 
the existing arrangements, they now have certain rights, and 
just distributive shares honor these claims»
9
, recognizes 
what might be considered a social truism: if you are going to 
cooperate, then you are reasonably waiting for a symmetri-
cal cooperative behavior from your partner. He/she is not 
going to defeat and he/she will work together with you. 
Your expectations are legitimate in the sense that «a just 
scheme, then, answers to what men are entitled to; it satis-
fies their legitimate expectations as founded upon social 
institutions»
10
. This last step is crucial. When are your ex-
pectations not just yours but your legitimate expectations? 
Surely not when you are considered from the point of view 
of the virtues that you are able to exhibit and play in social 
cooperation. These expectations are recognized as such in 
certain circumstances in which you act, but this does not 
imply that we have to refer to some minimal ontology that is 
attached to you and from which we must derive a kind of 
duty to satisfy certain expectations because they are yours. 
Your expectations are legitimate, because they are in accor-
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dance tow hat is asked by just social institutions. These so-
cial institutions are the structure that makes valuable what 
you are entitled to. But these entitlements have no existence 
before the implementation of just social structures. Namely, 
you are not the repository of any claims before there are just 
social structures that speak about them and recognize them 
in their own terms. 
There is a clear kinship between this way of arguing and 
what is theorized in the political philosophy of Hobbes and, 
in particular, in his Leviathan. Not surprisingly, Hobbes 
does not distinguish between civil society and state, but 
rather identifies them, since there is neither society nor sys-
tem of law nor moral law outside the system of the state. I 
think that in this paragraph Rawls makes a move in pure 
Hobbesian style, arguing that the social institutions are the 
structure that make valuable what you are entitled to. If this 
is true, then one must surely wonder about the mysterious 
absence of the name of Hobbes from the initial list of au-
thors cited, when Rawls quietly proclaims that his intention 
«is to present a conception of justice which generalizes and 
carries to a higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of 
the social contract as found, say, in Locke, Rousseau, Kant» 
(Hobbes is quoted in note 4 in the same page: «For all of its 
greatness, Hobbes’s Leviathan raises special problems»)
11
. 
But is this minimalism in Rawls’s contractualism really 
convincing? I think it is not, because what you are within 
there visited social contract by Rawls is summarized in a set 
of negative conditions. These negative conditions are the 
fact that as elfish decision maker, i.e. its economic version, 
the free rider, is not provided amongst the decision makers 
who can legitimately be chosen as the actors of social coop-
eration. For choosing to be a free rider you must be in pos-
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session of spatial-temporally extended psychophysical 
unity, which makes your own autobiography and is not 
available for any other definite description. Ina nutshell, you 
must have a proper name, which is excluded by the formal 
conditions of the original position. 
Selfishness is not, therefore, excluded from the initial 
conditions of choice as a generator of logical and practical 
paradoxes. That the so-called prisoner’s dilemma can be in-
terpreted as the stigmata of irrationality that mark the selfish 
acts is something that Rawls is not interested to stress. Self-
ishness is not irrationality: it is simply the possibility for the 
agent to refer to his/her own name. For this reason, proper 
names should be excluded from the initial conditions of 
choice, those that generate at least sub specie aeternitatis, 
perfect procedural justice. Procedural justice is not perfect 
utopia. It would be a radical equivocation to understand it in 
this way. Rather, it is a transcendental condition of our own 
ability to build and test the right. It is both a condition of pos-
sibility of what our experience lists under the name of coop-
eration and a basis for judging of our empirical cooperation. 
The concept of moral value and the concept of legitimate 
moral expectations are derived and are not primitive con-
cepts, since 
 
«The essential point is that the concept of moral worth does 
not provide a first principle of distributive justice. This is 
because it cannot be introduced until after the principles of 
justice and of natural duty and obligation have been ac-
knowledged. Once these principles are on hand, moral 
worth can be defined as having a sense of justice»
12
. 
 
So, what can you, the person that you are, rightly claim 
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from the point of view of justice as fairness? Nothing, be-
cause to do so you should always start by saying “I”, fill the 
blank line with your first and last name, start a letter saying 
“I, myself”. You are the one that must sign and not another 
person. The same vicarious decisions, simply refer to the 
possibility that, if you could, you would take yourself deci-
sions which someone else is taking for your own good. 
Since «the virtues can be characterized as desires or ten-
dencies to act upon the corresponding principles»
13
, they 
refer specifically to your autobiography. Your own autobi-
ography is, indeed, the only text where there is something 
like your desires and tendencies and where your proper 
name acquires its actual sense. The inclinations and desires 
are part of what you are and part of what you have become. 
Even if you believe that the quotation of Pindar, «you be-
come what you are», is a good description of you – maybe 
because you subscribe some perfectionist ethics – you still 
need to learn it, which means that there was a time that you 
should be able to remember when you were not what they 
are now. «So the concept of moral value is secondary to 
those of law and justice and has no substantive role in the 
determination of distributive shares»
14
. In short: right has 
precedence over good, which is a concept too broadly inclu-
sive and ambiguous, liable to abuses based on dubious sui 
generis knowledge. «The case is analogous to the relation-
ship between substantive rules of property and the laws on 
theft and robbery»
15
. To say that the good is prior to the 
right and that it coincides with fairness and equity, it would 
be like claiming that the crimes and violations of rights are 
prior to the institutions that account them for and provide 
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them for, or it would like to say that the shaping of coopera-
tion under the idea of perfect procedural justice is designed 
to reward merit and moral virtue. But the institution of 
property is not made to punish the thieves; it results from 
reasons that are independent of the contingent possibility of 
retribution and punishment. This is really a contingency, 
because it is empirical, but not in the same way in which the 
empirical material fills the transcendental, while the tran-
scendental keeps on representing the condition of possibility 
of the empirical. On the contrary, the idea of procedural jus-
tice would be the perfect condition of inability to reward 
virtue and moral merit.  
It could be objected that all observations are, in some 
way, softened by others that appear in the same places, 
which would support a position, so to speak, more adherent 
to our condition. Consider, for example, the apparent truism 
stated by Rawls: «In a well-ordered society individuals ac-
quire claims to a share of the social product by doing certain 
things encouraged by the existing arrangements»
16
. Nothing 
less unproblematic, it seems. But even this sentence is not 
so innocent. Rawls is arguing that if you deserve something 
it is because you are inside an adequate order, that of a well-
ordered society. Were there not a well-ordered society–and, 
perhaps, any society– your desert would have not any 
chance of being recognized, and one can say that it would 
not even exist. 
The fact is, indeed, that your personal acquisitions, your 
claims, a proper ascription of your own deserts make sense 
only within a scheme that is not your product. In a certain 
way, you, as a citizen of a society properly adequate with 
the concept of well-ordered society, are the product. For 
«The legitimate expectations that arise are the other side, so 
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to speak, of the principle of fairness and the natural duty of 
justice»
17
, your expectations are designed on justice as fair-
ness. «For in the way that one has a duty to uphold just ar-
rangements, and an obligation to do one’s part when one has 
accepted a position in them, so a person who has complied 
with the scheme and done his share has a right to be treated 
accordingly by others»
18
. But the acceptance of a particular 
social asset is less a voluntary act, than the product of your 
insurance rationality, the most important part of the theory 
of justice. When you join a just social asset you recognize 
what is already in you, and this is precisely your being enti-
tled to citizenship within a well-ordered society. 
But then is there any distinction between the possession of 
a valid entitlement for something and desert? To explain this 
distinction, that is its «familiar although non moral sense»
19
, 
Rawls elaborates an example. Imagine you have been watch-
ing a football match between two teams. After the match, we 
think that team A, which have lost the game, however, de-
served to win. «Here one does not mean that the victors are 
not entitled to claim the championship, or whatever spoils go 
to the winner»
20
.The losing team has performed the entire 
repertoire of sporting activities required by the degree of ex-
cellence in the sport and if it lost because of contingencies, it 
remains worthy of winning. But from the standpoint of a 
valid entitlement to claim the premium charged by the team 
that instead won the race, the loser cannot claim anything, 
even if it deserves to win or even if it actually lost. I think that 
the example of Rawls is, once again, enlightening and ex-
tremely interesting both for what he explicitly says and for 
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what he suggests. Similarly to the example of sport, even the 
best legal and economic structure – designed, obviously, as a 
tournament and not as a single race – will never lead to opti-
mal results in any case. In a fair match and in a fair society, 
you would probably have to win, since you got the right enti-
tlements together with the right abilities. However, you lost 
by the tournament rules without violating the right entitle-
ment of anybody. What can you really complain of? Bad 
luck, perhaps? But bad luck cannot of course be attributed to 
a fair social asset. Fair social assets could be implemented to 
correct and compensate for situations brought about by bad 
luck, but the motivation to implement them is not the asymp-
totic approximation to fairness, but rather important reasons 
for the relative stability of the social cooperation. So, you 
have no reason to complain in the very terms of the social 
agreement that, at least from the transcendental point of view, 
you would have signed. 
You could say that this is scant consolation. Maybe you 
could even go further and adapt to Rawls the savage irony 
that Hume threw on the social contract doctrine in the essay 
on the original contract and his nihilistic conclusion. In 
Hume’s opinion it is better not to speculate too much about 
the origin of the governments that we consider legitimate. 
We could have some unpleasant surprises, since most of the 
existing governments originate from violence, oppression, 
deceit. As Nozick would say, a good entitlement can be le-
gitimized only by a historical point of view. The problem is 
that nobody is able to put in place mechanisms that should 
switch back to the dawn of human history. So, the only 
claim is that you may advance in terms of what you are liv-
ing, of your social order if just (if the social asset you are 
living in is not coherent with justice as fairness, then we are 
going into a completely different matter). 
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should match moral worth at least to the extent that this is 
feasible. They may believe that unless those who are better 
off have superior moral character, their having greater ad-
vantages is an affront to our sense of justice»
21
. 
But when you had made such objection you would have put 
yourself outside the sphere of justice as fairness, because 
you would have esteem as relevant for justice precisely con-
siderations regarding the proper name which are completely 
irrelevant in the construction and design of just social ar-
rangements. Thus, «Even when things transpire in the best 
way, there is still no tendency for distribution and virtue to 
coincide»
22
.You might think that this concerns only dis-
tributive justice, but, even leaving aside the formidable 
question of retribution of desert, Rawls suggests that it 
would lead us to a strongly restricted vision of justice as 
fairness. On the contrary, as a matter of fact, «In a well-
ordered society there would be no need for the penal law 
except insofar as the assurance problem made it neces-
sary»
23
. So what in the end can you meaningfully claim 
from the perspective of perfect procedural justice? Actually 
nothing, since there would be no wrong to be corrected, 
there would be no social positions to compensate – the un-
equal position in society is simply motivated by the fact of 
attracting talent to professional positions where they are 
most needed –. Fairness has been already built into the 
original position from the outset. It, therefore, makes no 
sense to make critical demands after the contractualistic 
move, which has been designed precisely to avoid them. Or 
rather, it would be meaningful only if you will remember 
that life socially, cooperatively, conflictually you are living 
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in the transcendental perspective of justice as fairness im-
plies the still modest, but unredeemable, transcendental of 
your psycho-physical units, of your biography, of your “I 
think”, as we might say if we wanted to force the Kantian 
expression. That is: it would be meaningful, only if you 
think that your own name at all times keeps, beyond your 
narcissism, your equivocal frustration of being just the per-
son you are, an importance that the social modeling wants to 
deny. So, the conclusion that, in my view, should be drawn 
from this discussion is that the rawlsian critique of utilitari-
anism – not taking seriously into account the real separate-
ness of person – should be fully ascribed to his theoretical 
construction too. 
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